In 1987, a benchmark model for these mechanisms was proposed by McAfee and McMillan. The optimal design for these mechanisms was proposed by Roger Myerson, which was based on the more specific direct revelation mechanism. A party involved in these mechanisms is incentivized to release all information per the linkage principle. The 2020 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Milgrom and Wilson for their work on these mechanisms. A form of these mechanisms that follows the revenue-equivalence theorem was expanded by William Vickrey. Each player has a weakly dominating strategy in the “second-price” form of these events. “English” or “Dutch” versions of these events are distinguished by whether price is ascending or decreasing. For 10 points, name these events where goods are sold through bidding. ■END■
| Player | Team | Opponent | Buzz Position | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Joseph Chambers | Virginia | Virginia Tech A | 34 | -5 |
| Graham Troy | North Carolina A | Liberty C | 75 | 10 |
| Jeffery Austin | North Carolina C | Liberty A | 90 | 10 |
| Chris Yoo | William and Mary | Virginia Tech B | 93 | 10 |
| John McQueen | South Carolina A | VCU | 108 | 10 |
| Dan Rajaratnam | NC State B | Liberty B | 126 | 10 |
| Noah Fine | North Carolina B | South Carolina B | 126 | 10 |
| Orion Keller | Virginia Tech A | Virginia | 126 | 10 |