In 1987, a benchmark model for these mechanisms was proposed by McAfee and McMillan. The optimal design for these mechanisms was proposed by Roger Myerson, which was based on the more specific direct revelation mechanism. (-5[1])A party (10[1])involved in these mechanisms (-5[1])is incentivized to release all information per the linkage (10[1])principle. (10[2])The 2020 Nobel Prize for Economics (10[2])was awarded (10[2]-5[1])to Milgrom and Wilson (10[1])for their work on these mechanisms. A form (10[1])of these mechanisms (10[1])that follows (10[1])the revenue-equivalence theorem (10[1])was expanded by William Vickrey. (10[6])Each player (10[2])has a weakly (10[1])dominating strategy (10[1]-5[1])in the “second-price” (10[1])form of these (10[1])events. (10[3])“English” (10[3])or “Dutch” (10[1])versions of these events (10[3])are (10[1])distinguished (10[1])by whether (10[1])price (10[1])is (10[1])ascending or decreasing. (10[2])For 10 points, name these events where (10[1])goods are sold through bidding. (10[6])■END■