Question

Answer the following about designing strategyproof games, in which players are incentivized to be truthful about their preferences, for 10 points each.
[10e] No strategyproof rule exists for performing this process non-dictatorially among more than two alternatives, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Limitations on systems for this process are described by Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
ANSWER: voting
[10m] Description acceptable. To strategyproof a sealed-bid auction, in which contestants do not know each other’s bids, the winner pays this price for the item won, rather than the amount they bid themselves.
ANSWER: second highest bid [accept second price auction; accept answers indicating the second highest bid plus some small amount]
[10h] The generalized second-price auction is not strategyproof when there are multiple items for sale, so companies like Facebook opt for these other auctions to sell ad space. In these auctions, bidders pay their externalities.
ANSWER: VCG auction [or VCG mechanism or Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction]
<VD, Social Science>

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James Madison ASouth Carolina B0000
James Madison BSouth Carolina A1010020
North Carolina BNC State1010020
DukeNorth Carolina A100010
Cambridge ABirmingham1010020
OxfordEdinburgh1010020
DurhamImperial A1010020
Imperial BCambridge B100010
WarwickBristol100010
Maryland AGeorge Washington A1010020
Johns HopkinsGeorgetown100010
Maryland BGeorge Washington B0000
Michigan AKenyon B1010020
Kenyon AMichigan B010010
Ohio State A Ohio State B100010
Ganon Evans Fan ClubArizona State1010020
FarrellmagnetismBoston College1010020
MSU A and FriendZen and the Art of Buzzing1010020
Texas AHCC100010
TAG Magnet: Taylor's VersionTexas B1010020
TAMUTexas C100010
Georgia AEmory A0000
Georgia Tech AGeorgia B100010
Georgia Tech DGeorgia Tech C1010020
Georgia Tech BTennessee A1010020