A Milgrom, North, & Weingast paper proposed an “adjusted” variant of this approach applied to the “Law Merchant” system. This approach is worse when subject to “echo effects,” which was proven against an algorithm developed by Johann Joss. One book articulates the effectiveness of this approach due to its properties of “clarity,” “niceness,” “retaliatory,” and “forgiving.” A version of this approach seeking to avoid a “death spiral” inserts the number (*) “two” in its name. Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation primarily analyzes this “nice” strategy, which was determined to be the best solution in a tournament using the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. This trigger strategy differs from the grim trigger by not enforcing maximal punishment for defection. For 10 points, name this game theory strategy in which a player cooperates and then copies their opponent’s previous action. ■END■
ANSWER: tit for tat [or TFT; accept tit for two tats or TFTT; accept adjusted tit for tat or ATFT; prompt on trigger strategy until read; prompt on cooperation until read]
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= Average correct buzz position