A paper titled for this concept argues that “functional explanations” can account for phenomena like reportability, but not this concept. Reportability defines the “access” type (10[1])of this concept, (10[2])which Ned Block (10[2])distinguished (10[1])from its (10[1])“phenomenal” (10[1])type. (-5[2])Joseph Levine argued that theories of this concept (10[1])struggle (10[1])to explain (-5[1])subjectivity due to (10[1])the explanatory (10[2])gap. (10[2]-5[1])The phi (10[1]-5[1])phenomenon (10[2])is evidence for (-5[1])the theory that this (10[1])concept arises from many (-5[1])sources of input (10[2]-5[1])and systems of (-5[1])interpretation, (10[1]-5[4])called the multiple drafts model. (10[1]-5[1])David (10[1])Chalmers (10[1])argued (-5[2])that science (10[1])cannot (10[3])even (10[2])attempt (10[3])to explain (10[5])why this concept (-5[1])exists, (10[4]-5[1])which is its “hard (10[1])problem.” (10[20])Philosophical (10[6])zombies (10[5])lack this concept. (10[5]-5[2])For (10[1])10 (-5[1])points, (-5[2])a book by Daniel Dennett “explains” what concept, (10[4])which is the mental awareness of one’s (10[1])experience? (10[8])■END■ (10[16]0[1])