In a 1999 paper, Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker argued that this view does not require conceptual analysis. A book titled for this view calls the issues of mental causation and consciousness the “Two World-Knots.” That book by Jaegwon Kim is titled for this view “or something near enough.” In the 1950s, (15[1])U. T. Place, Herbert Feigl, (15[1])and J. J. C. Smart developed a variant of this view that was attacked (15[1])in the paper “The Nature of Mental States.” Hilary Putnam used (*) multiple realizability (10[1])to challenge a variant of this view named for types, which is contrasted with another variant named for tokens. In the paper “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Frank Jackson attacked this view using the knowledge argument. For 10 points, name this position in the (-5[1])philosophy (10[1])of mind which holds that mental states can either be reduced to or are dependent on phenomena (10[1]-5[1])like neurons firing. ■END■ (10[1]0[3])